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Christopher Columbus started a chain reaction of exploration and conquest when
he landed in the New World in1492. He and conquistadors, Hern6n Cortes and
Francisco Pizarro, were vastly outnumbered by the native population, yet their small
armies subdued millions of subjects in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru. Whereas,
Columbus conquered the Arawaks in the 1490s, Cortds conquered the Aztecs in the
I520s, and Pizano conquered the Incas in the 1530s. In the latter case, just before the
Spanish arrived, the strong, united Inca Empire was divided into a bloody civil war. The
weakened state of the empire helped Pizarro gain control. Pizarro did this by
manipulating existing conditions, and using the knowledge he had of Hernan Cort6s and
his conquest of the Aztecs. The tensions within the empire and Pizarro's manipulations
were not the only reasons for Pizarro's success. Other factors, such as Spanish
superiority in weaponry and tactics of warfare, Spanish diseases that weakened the
Indians, Spanish alliances with the native population, and the use of horses, all
contributed to Spanish success. Yet, Francisco Pizarro's manipulations of the rifts that
the civil war caused within the Inca Empire, and his employment of the methods he had
learned from Hernan Cortds, in his conquest of Mexico, provided the greatest aid to the
Spanish during their conquest of Peru.
In order to understand how Pizano exploited the various factions and divisions
within the Inca empire, it is useful to see how this state itself was the product of a series
of conquests. The Incas as a people can be dated back to 1200 A.D. in the vicinity of
Cuzco, located in the central Andean highlands. The Incas were a relatively small group,
and they found themselves surrounded by militaristic chiefdoms and kingdoms. They
were forced to adapt themselves to this competitive situation; otherwise they would have
vanished. 
l The first eight kings, called Incas, began to conquer areas around Cuzco.
They further began to expand their empire around 1438 and over the next 100 years, they
defeated many of their neighbors. The empire reached its full extent under the rule of
Huayna Capac in 1525.?
The Incas called their empire Tahuantinsttyumeaninu, "Land of the Four
Quarters," in reflection of the vast area of land it covered.3 The ninth Inca, Pachacuti
Inca Yupanqui, built an extraordinary network of roads and bridges to unite the empire.
The establishment of a "postal system," which was maintained by a series of messengers,
was the fastest method of communication in the world at that time. This system enabled
the Incas to keep a firm gnp on both political and military aspects of the empire.a New
territories were drawn into the empire by diplomacy or conquest. Administrative
programs began in Cuzco to impose a common religion and the Inca language, Quechuq
throughout the empire.s
The Incas ruled by fear. Historian Sarmiento de Gamboa believed they ruled
without the consent of their subjects. "Pachacuti Inca held people in such terror that for
fear of being devoured by wild animals (in the Inca prisons in Cuzco), or burnt or cruelly
' Geoffrey W. Conrad and Arthur A. Demarest, Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec ond
Inca Expansionism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 106.
' Refer to Appendix A.
3 Michael A. Malpass, Daily Life in the Inca Empire, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996),
1.
a Richard Berg, "Conquistador: Pizarro and the Conquest of Peru, 1524-33," Strategt and Tactics
no. 58 (1976): 5.
5 
Charles Gbso4 The Inca Concept of Sovereignty and the Spanish Adninistration in Peru, ${ew
York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 10.
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tortured, they surrendered to him and obeyed."6 The conquistadors would later exploit
this fear and hatred oflnca rule.
The Inca state became the largest empire ever formed by a native society in the
Americas. Despite its size, the army that brought it down contained only a few hundred
men. The empire endured only for a century, largely due to the weaknesses of its
government. One aspect of this weakness was that there was no set rule for succession.T
The Inca named as his successor the son who he judged most capable of governing. Just
before Pizwro arrived in Peru the issue of succession caused a feud between Atahualpa
and Huascar, the Inca's two sons. Ultimately, this feud divided the empire in a civil war.
As Huayna Capac lay dying of smallpox he named his son, Ninan Cuyuche, his
heir. Although Ninan Cuyuche was the favorable choice, this act resolved nothing,
because the same epidemic that had struck Huayna Capac also killed Ninan Cuyuche.
Huascar was next in line, but there was a twist. Huayna Capac's favorite son was
Atahualpa, who being born of a mother from Quito, a non-Inca, was not considered a
legitimate successor. Huayna Capac wished to make provisions for Atahualpa's future,
and called Huascar to him. Inca practice dictated that the entire empire fell to the heir,
but since he wished see Atahualpa provided for, he asked that Huascar allow Atahualpa
to inherit Quito, "which belonged to his maternal ancestors."t Huascar agreed to this, but
he soon grew distrustful of Atahualpa. Huayna Capac died the same day the Spanish
arrived in Peru in 1527. They didn't stay long, but their presence made quite a stir
throughout the empire.
u 
Sabine MacCormaclq *The Fall of the Incas: A Historiographical Dilemm4" History of
European ldeas 6, no. 4 (1985): 429.
7 Gibsoq 15.
8 Edward Hyams and George Ordish, The Iast of the Incas: The Rise and Fall of an American
Empire, (New York: Dorset Press, 1963), 126.
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After Huayna Capac's death, Atahualpa remained in Quito and even though he
swore his allegiance to Huascar, Huascar demanded that Atahualpa come to Cuzco.
Huascar warned him that if he did not come, he would regard him as an enemy and
attack. Atahualpa consulted his two generals, Quizquiz and Chalcuchima, who advised
him to strike first.e So began the civil war.
The feud between Atahualpa and Huascar was not the first conflict over
succession. Although it showed the weakness of the Inca system, in this case, it had even
greater consequences than in past cases for it coincided with the arrival of the Spanish.r0
When the Spanish returned in1532, their conquest began the same day, as they found the
Incas divided by civil war. John Hemming believes thatPizano was fortunate to have
arrived during this "war of dynastic succession," for when he learned of the civil war he
hoped that, like Hernan Cort6s, he could manipulate rival factions.lt Pizarro learned of
the civil war when he reached the town of Tumbez and found it in ruins - a victim of the
civil war. As Pedro Pizarro wrote, they then moved on to Pohechos, where they received
news that Atahualpa was waging war on Huascar, who was the natural lord.12
The Spanish arrived just as Atahualpa's strike on Cuzco succeeded in taking
Huascar captive. Immediately, Atahualpa proclaimed himself Inca. Atahualpa knew his
claim to the tkone was weak, so he ordered the massacre of Huascar's heirs - anyone
who had legitimate claim to the throne. But he kept Huascar alive. This eventually
posed another threat to Atahualpa, but in the meantime, he used it lure other members of
e Augustin deZfuate, The Discovery and Conquest of Peru,trans. J.M. Cohen @ngland: Penguin
Books, 1968),59-60.
ro Gbson, 16.
f f fonn Hemrning, The Conquest of the Incas, (London: Macmillarq lgi}),28,3A.
12 Pedro Pizano. Retation of the Discovery ond Conqoesr of the Kingdois of Pera, trans. Philip
Ainsworth Means (New York: The Cortes Society, l92l'),7:165.
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Huascar's faction into the open." Atahualpa was on his way to victory, but he had not
yet consolidated his success by the time of Spanish arrival.la According to historians
Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur Demarest, the civil war left the empire "shattered and all the
Spaniards had to do was pick up the pieces."rs The Spanish would be the true victors of
the civil war.
After his army captured Huascar, Atahualpa was in Cajamarca making plans to
leave for Cuzco, where he expected to be crowned. Just as he was about to leave, he
heard of the arrival of the Spaniards. He decided to put offhis departure, and wait for
them to come to him.16 This proved to be his fatal mistake.
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Huascar as prisoner of Atahualpa
(Juan de Betanzos, The Narrative of the Incas, (Austin:
University ofTexas Press, 1996), 240.)
The arrival of Spanish Ships
(Huam6n pe6a, Letter to a King, (New York Dutlorl
1978), 106.)
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The civil war deprived the empire of the leadership and unity it so desperately
needed at the time of the Spaniards' arrival. Pedro Pizarro illustrated this point.
Had Huayna Capac been alive when we Spaniards entered this land it
would have been impossible to win it, for he was so greatly loved by his
subjects . . . Also, if the land had not been divided by the wars of Huascar
and Atahualpa, we could not have entered or conquered it unless over a
thousand Spaniards come simultaneously. 17
Francisco Pizarro saw how the civil war and the unexpectedness of their arrival
could be exploited.18 Pizarro saw the advantages in choosing sides, and trying to create
alliances. At first Pizarro told native peoples that he favored Huascar, because as Pedro
Pizarro wtote, the Spaniards believed Huascar to be "the natural Lord of the kingdom."re
But after he heard that Atahualpa had captured Huascar, he shifted his alliance to
Atahualpa, because after all, "legitimacy''is not important when it comes to strategy.2o
When Pizarro learned that Atahualpa was in Cajamarca, he decided to go there,
but not without waiting for reinforcements. His reinforcements came with Sebastian de
Benalcazar and Hernando de Soto. In the meantime, he had established the first
permanent Spanish settlement in Peru, San Miguel de Piura. On September 24,1532,
Pizano left San Miguel with 106 foot soldiers,62 horsemen, and 4 cannon. They were
on their way to meet Atahualpa in Cajamarca.
Atahualpa heard about the Spanish and sent an envoy to meet them. They arrived
at Cajas the same time as the Spaniards. They extended an invitation to Pizarro to meet
with Atahualpa.2r Along the way, Pizarro and his men had established peaceful relations
with the Indians. According to Francisco de Jerez (Pizarro's secretary), before Pizarro's
17 Hemming, 55.
18 MacCormack, "The Fall of the lncas",422.




arrival at Cajamarca, he had learned that Atahualpa was preparing for war. He heard
from a village chief that "Atahualpa was waiting in great pride and that he had heard him
boast that every Christian would be killed."22 This left Pizarro with the impression that
he must strike first.
Atahualpa's intentions were unclear. However, he allowed the Spaniards to make
their way to Cajamarca. By doing so, he severely misjudged them, because he thought a
group of 168 men could do nothing against his army. Richard Berg believes this decision
was the first of many miscalculations that led to Spanish victory. If Atahualpa's army
had attacked while the Spaniards were on the narrow mountain passes, their horses and
artillery would have been ineffective and Pizarro's army would most likely have been
slaughtered on the spot.23
When the Spaniards reach Cajamarca, they encountered an Inca army of 40,000
men. Pizarro sent a party led by Hernando de Soto to seek an audience with Atahualpa.
When they met the Inca, he showed no interest in de Soto, but he perked up when
Hernando Pizarro began to speak to him, as he realized he was Francisco Pizarro's
brother. Atahualpa agreed to meet with Pizarro the next day.
Pizarro began to make his plans. He knew by Cort6s' example that the element of
surprise would work to his advantage. He had to strike first, for if Atahualpa decided to
make the first move, his army was doomed.2a Pizano used the large buildings in the
square at Cajamarca to hide his cavalry and foot soldiers, which were ready to move at
his command. Pizarro himself hid, along with some of his men, with the objective of
22 Zilrate, Sl
23 Berg, 11.
2a Berg, I l.
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ambushing the Incas and grabbing Atahualpa. Pizarro remembered the reaction of the
Aztecs to Montezuma's capture, and felt that a similar strategy would work.2s
foHnESE
Plan of Cqiamarca
(Edward Hyams and George Ordish, The Last of the.Irzcas, (New York: Dorset Press, 1963), 208.)
While the Spaniards waited in Cajamarca, Atahualpa appeared to be in no hurry to
meet them. The Spaniards began to fear that a night attack was planned. To this, they
had no defense. Pizarro sent a messenger inviting Atahualpa for dinner and told him that
he had nothing to fear. They meant him no harm. Atahualpa agreed to this, and he left
the majority of his army outside and entered the square with 5000 men armed only with
ceremonial axes. When he reached the square, he was surprised to find it empty.26
Atahualpa's concern was magnified when a lone figure emerged from a building and
walked towards him. It was Fray Vincente de Valverde. He began to explain the
Christian religion and demand that the Incas convert. Fray Vincente was reading from
the requierimiento, a formal document that the Spaniards read before hostilities began.
8
25 Berg, 1l
26 Berg, I I
This document gave the enemy the chance to embrace Christianity and Spanish rule,
rather than submit in baule.2' Fray Vincente then presented Atahualpa with the breviary.
Atahualpa ultimately rejected this holy book. The Spanish government considered that
by this action, a war of conquest was justified.28 The Inca, Garcilaso de la Vega believed
that Fray Vicente's speech was harsh before the presentation of the breviary, and the
translation made it worse.2e When Atahualpa took the breviary,he "turned over the
leaves from end to end, saying that it said nothing to him. In fact it did not speak at all.









Sebastian de Benalcazar and Eernando Pizarro's
meeting with Atahualpa (Juan de Br/lmzas, Natotive
of the Incas, (Austin: Univ. ofTexas, 1996), 257.)
Fray Valverde presenting the br*iary
(Edward Hyams and George Ordish, The Last of the












Although armed and numerically superior, the Incas in the square died without
raising a hand. The appearance of the horses seemed critical. The horses were wearing
large rattles, and the sight and sound of them charging amidst booming cannon and
flashing muskets was too much.3l Many of these men fled. Those who stayed died.
Atahualpa had been carried in on a liuer. As the Spaniards were trying to get to
Atahualpa, they had to strike down the men who were supporting him. Since it was the
retainers' job to protect their Inca, as one man was struck down, another one took his
place. Finally, the litter tumbled. Just as one Spanish soldier was about to strike
Atahualpa, Pizano reached out and stopped the blow. He wanted the Inca alive. Pizarro
grabbed Atahualpa and took him into one of the buildings.
The Spanish did not stop their assault with the capture of Atahualpa. The cavalry
charged out into the rest of the army that was waiting outside of Cajamarca. Here, the
Spanish met little resistance; massacring the men they found there. Historian Richard
Berg estimates that 7000 of Atahualpa's soldiers were killed during the course of two to
three hours. The only Spanish casualty was the damage to Pizarro's hand when he was
protecting Atahualpa.32 This event marked the beginning of the end of the Inca empire.
As Huamdn Poma saw it, with Atahualpa's capture "our Indians lost all sense of direction
... forgot their gods and missed the authority of their rulers."33
Pizarro wondered why Atahualpa had not realized this was a trap. Atahualpa had
underestimated them, and his plan had backfired - he had hoped to capture Pizarro.3a
When Atahualpa was questioned on his strategy, Captain Cristobal de Mena reports that
3l Berg, ll.
32 Berg, 14.
33 Castro-Klaren, 'May We Not Perish", 170
3a Hemming, 4445.
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"[Atahualpa] answered half smiling ... that he had intended to capture the Govemor but
the reverse had happened."3s Atahualpa was reluctant to accept his fate. He believed that
his main problem, while in custody, was not the Spanish and he directed his attention to
the end of the civil war. Pizano allowed him to rule from captivity, which maintained the
fiction that Atahualpa was in control. Pizarro had learned from Cort6s that by keeping
Atahualpa in confinement, he was continuing the pretense of his leadership. This gave
Atahualpa the impression that the Spanish presence was only temporary.36
The Inca Atahualpa as a prisoner ofthe Spaniards
(Juan de Betanzos, Narrative of the Incas, (Austin: Univ. of
Texas Press, 1996), 265.)
Even though they had Atahualpa in their custody, the Spanish still feared attack
by the remainder of Atahualpa's armies. Atahualpa had three large armies stationed
around the empire, under the leadership of his most powerful generals. General Quizquiz






Ruminavi was there with a third army. Richard Berg suggests they were reluctant to
move out of fear of relinquishing newly won territories. They were after all, still fighting
the civil war.37
In the meantime, Atahualpa was still optimistic that Spanish presence was only
temporary. He noticed the Spaniards interest in gold, and delivered Pizarro anamazing
proposition. Atahualpa offered to fill a room full of gold, on the condition that when this
ransom was fulfilled, he would be released. Atahualpa believed that if the Spaniards got
what they wanted, they would leave.38 Atahualpa's ransom proved to be a blessing for
Pizano, for he never intended on letting him go.3e It merely served as a chance to buy
more time. Pizano realizedthat in the time it took to fulfill this bargain, he could wait
for Diego de Almagro to come to Cajamarca with reinforcements.ao He began to send his
owlr men out in search of treasure.
While Pizarro remained in Cajamarca waiting for the collection of the ransom, the
Spaniards began to grow apprehensive about Atahualpa's intent. Considering that
Atahualpa had three armies, and a native population the Spaniards had no control over,
they began to imagine plots for their overthrow. Pizarro remained confident, in light of
his knowledge of the Aztecs, that the Incas would do nothing unless provoked.ar
Meanwhile, Hemando Pizarro was in Jauja trying to collect treasure there, but he left
with a much more valuable prize. While in Jauja, Hernando convinced Atahualpa's
general, Chalcuchima to return to Cajamarca with him. With Chalcuchima in custody,







for, as historian John Hemming believes, he was the only one who could bridge the rift
between the two factions that the civil war had caused.a2
Hernando Pizano returned to Cajamarca with Chalcuchima in tow. The
Spaniards held the belief that the Incas were withholding treasure from them. They tried
to gain information from Chalcuchima, and even though he protested he knew nothing,
they tried to torture a confession out of him by burning him. The Spaniards had burned
his arms and legs before they finally believed in his innocence. They then put
Chalcuchima under guard, for fear of an uprising. Their treatment of Chalcuchima was a
reflection of the fear they felt towards the risk of being affacked.a3
While Atahualpa was in custody, there was still the matter of Huascar's
whereabouts. Since he was still alive, his faction also posed a threat, Pizarro inquired to
Atahualpa about Huascar and learned that he was in custody of Atahualpa's men. He
ordered that Huascar be brought to Cajamarca. By Agustin de Zinate's account, Huascar
was on his way to Cajamarca when he met up with some Spanish soldiers, whom he
promised gold if they would bring him to Pizarro and have the conquistador settle the
case between the two brothers. Apparently, when Atahualpa heard of this, it made him
nervous. He plotted Huascar's death out of fear he would lose his kingdom.aa Atahualpa
was tricky in the way he gained "permission" for Huascar's murder. When Pizarro went
to visit him one day, he found Atahualpa crying. He told Pizano that his men had killed
Huascar when he had given them explicit orders not to harm him. He remembered how
Pizano had threatened him with death if his brother was not brought to Cajamarca alive,
and he did not want to be blamed for this. Pizarro consoled him and did not hold him
a2 Hemming, 67.
a3 Berg 16.* Zerate, 107-109
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accountable. Since Huascar was still alive, Atahualpa ordered his summary murder, so it
would appear his story to Pizarro was accurate. Atahualpa had Huascar killed in the hope
of giving himself an advantage. He was still confident in his release and could not afford
to lose his war with Huascar.ot But, this plot proved to be his undoing.
With the death of Huascar, some of the Spaniards began to fear that Atahualpa
would gain control of the empire, and they were afraid of an uprising. When Pizarro first
came to Cajamarca, he could act as arbitrator and hold out hope to both factions.
However, with the death of Huascar, the threat of a revolt created new tensions among
them.a6 The Spaniards knew they could never release Atahualpa, because there would
always be the danger of attack. They concluded that if he were dead, they would be in
less danger. Miguel de Estete wrote in regards to Atahualpa's fate, "With his death it
would all cease and the land would be calmed."47 The Spanish needed to act quickly,
however, because they had collected the ransom, yet failed to release Atahualpa.
In mid-April1533, Pizarro's much needed reinforcements arrived. Almagro
arrived with 150 men and horses. Up until then, Atahualpa had been optimistic about his
fate, but with these new arrivals, he began to see his situation differently and began to
fear that he was going to die.a8 Since these new arrivals had not fought in the original
battle, they had a great fear of the Inca army. In addition,Pizarro had been waiting for






Atahualpa's presence would draw the army to them.ae Atahualpa's fate was thus
determined.
Not everyone in the Spanish camp was in agteement about the situation. There
were those who supported Atahualpa, thinking it foolish to kill him when his presence
assured peace within the empire. Hernando de Soto felt that they were honor-bound to
release him. It was Almagro's men who saw little need in releasing him.so In order to
sort out their differences, the men set up a trial, but the cards were stacked against
Atahualpa from the onset. A number of false charges were brought out against him, but
the only charges with some sort of merit were those that stated he had usurped Huascar's
rightful sovereignty of Cuzco, and that he had later killed him. He was also charged with
the act of plotting against the Spaniards. Historian Phillip Ainsworth Means attests that
those were the only "sane" charges.sl The men sentenced Atahualpa to death. This was
especially hard on Pizarro, as he had grown quite fond of the Inca.52 The death of
Atahualpa was a sacrifice Pizarro had to make, for, as historian John Hemming states,
this act brought relief to the local natives who felt his rule was "oppression by the Quitan
victors of the civil war."53
The forces of Pizarro and Almagro would soon leave Cajamarca to push their
conquest into the heart of the Inca Empire. They began to prepare for their march to
Cuzco. Atahualpa's death had placed Pizarro in the good graces of the Huascar faction,
and as he marched to Cuzco, he wished to appear as their liberator.sa Pizarro may have
ae Hemming, 84-85.
50 Berg, 16.
,, fnifp Ainsworth Me ans, Fall of the Inca Empire and the Spanish Rule in Peru, 1530-1780,





delivered the Incas from Atahualpa's rule, but he needed to find a suitable replacement,
as the Incas were not yet ready to accept Spanish rule.
The execution of Atahualpa (HuamanPoma,
Letter to a King, (New York Dution, 1978), I12.)
As soon as Atahualpa was buried, Pizarro, in the words of Pedro Sancho,
"immediately ordered all the caciques and chiefs who were residing in the city in the
court of the dead ruler ... to assemble in the main square so that he could grve them
another ruler who would govern in the name of His Majesty."5t They all found Tupac
Hualpa acceptable.
Tupac Hualpa was the perfect choice, as historian Charles Gibson has pointed out.
He was the son of Huayna Capac, yet he had remained friendly with Atahualpa to avoid
the fate ofHuascar's family, and had moreover professed friendship to the Spaniards. He




making him his puppet ruler, and hoped he could unite the entire empire under his rule.
This was strategically important, as "peaceful unity was preferable to division and
conflict."s7 Pizano watched the natives' reaction to this appointment, and he would have
picked a new leader had he sensed any dissatisfaction. The natives made it clear,
however, that they would support Pizarro's decision.5s
There were three plots by natives to appoint another leader. One of these plots
was lead by the general Chalcuchima. Even though he was still in custody, he still had
the power to foil Pizarro's plans. His machinations began to take shape during the
Spaniards march to Cuzco. According to historian John Hemming, when the men left
Cajamarca on 11 August 1533,
They were attempting one of the most staggering invasions in history.
Without supplies, communications or reinforcements, this tiny contingent
was trying to force its w-ay into the heart of an enonnous, hostile empire,
to seize its capital city."
The Spaniards felt they had the protection of having Tupac Hualpa with them,
but word soon reached them that Chalcuchima's army was preparing to resist. The
Spaniards met his army at Jauja. They used their horses to their advantage. They used
atacticthat was effective in the conquest of Mexico. They immediately charged at the
native soldiers, and as more horsemen entered the city, the native troops were pushed
back. Some of these soldiers fled, but the ones who stayed were killed. The Spanish
struck fast, and used the element of surprise to their advantage. They won the city of






the forces of Quizquiz,butthe Spaniards quickly cut them off. The Inca army put up a
fight, but the Spaniards were ruthless.tr
The Spanish alone cannot take credit for their victory. Pizarro had already
begun the work creating alliances with native peoples. The civil war and Atahualpa's
capture had weakened the Inca Empire. A lot of the newly conquered tribes had not
been fully assimilated into the empire. This accounts for the hostility the Jauja Huancas
showed towards the Inca arny, for they had taken the side of the Spaniards. According
to historian John Hemming,
Regionalism and tribalism became increasingly important with the melting
away of recently imposed Inca systems of government. It was invaluable
to Spanish invaders - just as useful as the dynastic schism of the civil war,
and the indifference of the native masses to the fate of the upper classes of
Inca society.6l
Chalcuchima was still trying to find a way to usurp Spanish authority. His plan
was to discredit Tupac Hualpa. According to Pedro Pizxro, he encouraged the
disobedience of native groups along the way, and presented this as evidence that as Inca,
Tupac Hualpa was not respected.62 Tupac Hualpa was poisoned soon after. Chalcuchima
was the most likely suspect for Tupac Hualpa's murder, but Francisco Pizarro did not
connect him with the crime until it later. Chalcuchima was offered the regency of the
whole land until a suitable replacement could be made. His disloyalty to the Spaniards
continued, until they discovered him and subsequently burned him a1ive.63
For his next puppet ruler, Pizarro decided it would be in his best interests to






he hoped he would be able to employ the Cuzco forces against the armies of Quito.64
Manco Inca presented himself to Pizarro as a legitimate candidate. Pizarro decided to
crown Manco and rule the native population through him. His appointment as Inca
achieved local unity. Historian Philip Ainsworth Means recognized the importance of
this decision, but he believes that Pizano "was doing with the Inca Manco what he ought
to have done with Atahualpa while the latter was still supreme in the land.-65 Manco
appeared to be the perfect puppet ruler, for during his early reign, he showed favor
towards the Spaniards, and tried to maintain goodwill. By the end of 1533, it looked as
though Spanish victory was virtually complete. But Pizarro had one more obstacle to
face.
After he had capured Cuzco and appointed Manco as Inca, he made the mistake
of moving the capital to Lima. He should have taken his cue from Cort6s, who preserved
political continuity by building his new capital of Mexico City over the ruins of the Aztec
capital of Tenochtitlan. The move to Lima, historian J.H. Elliot believes, made the
Spanish vulnerable to Manco's revolt.tr
Manco had remained in Cuzco to begin his rule as Inca. He was content with his
position for about two years, but then he grew dissatisfied. Perhaps, as historian Phillip
Ainsworth Means has suggested, the "Inca had hoped, from the beginning of his pseudo-
reign, that his ancestors' power would eventually be restored to him in fu11."67 After
Manco realizedhe would always be a Spanish puppet, and as his discontent grew, he






Pizano were meeting in Lima. Pizarro decided to send his brother to Cuzco to act as
lieutenant governor. Soon after Hernando Pizarro arrived in Cuzco, in February 1536,
Manco Inca tricked him into letting him leave the city. Manco promised that he would
return with "a man made of gold."68 Instead, in March l536,he revolted and laid siege to
Cuzco.
Before beginning the attack on Cuzco, Manco's followers also attacked Lima, so
as to pin down Francisco Pizarro and his men there. That left a Spanish army of 196 men
in Cuzco, under the leadership of Hernando, Juan, and Gonzalo Pizarro, to fight an Inca
army that numbered at least 100,000 men.u' The Spanish only had eighty horses, and the
responsibility of fighting fell on the cavalry, for the Spanish infantry was inferior to that
of the natives, who were more accustomed to the high altitude of Cuzco.70 Although the
Spanish were outnumbered, they did have the advantage of occupying the city center.
The Incas, however, occupied the fortress of Sacsahuam6n. This gave the Incas the
initial advantage in the battle, but once the Spanish captured the fortress, at the cost of
losing Juan Pizarro's life, they regained the upper hand. This made Manco's army more
vulnerable to horsemen.Tl The narrow streets increased the effectiveness of their horses,
by allowing small numbers of men to attack in any given area. Once the Spaniards
captured Sacsahuamiin, they were able to beat back the Incas. On the outskirts of the
city, the horse was the Spaniards best weapon. The Spaniards soon learned of some
information that gave them another advantage. Religious celebrations at every new moon
68 Means, 60.
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brought an end to native fighting. During this time, the Spanish were able to regroup,
and prepare for the next attack.7z
The Spaniards at Cuzco were growing weary after ayear of fighting, and feared
that no relief was coming. The natives ambushed any reinforcements that Francisco
Pizarro tried to send. Pizarro began to appeal for help outside of Peru. He wrote the
following plea to Pedro de Alvarado, the Governor of Guatemala:
The Inca has the city of Cuzco besieged, and for five months I have heard
nothing about the Spaniards in it. The country is so badly damaged that
no native chiefs now serve us, and they have won many victories agaig.st
us. It causes me such great sorrow that it is consuming my entire life. "
Reinforcements from the outside began to arrive in Lima near the end of 1536.
Pizuronow had the manpower to help him reconquer Peru. Pizano sent out his own
relief to Cuzco, but at the same time, another Spanish army was heading towards Cuzco.
Diego de Almagro's expedition was returning from Chile. He had left Cuzco twenty
months earlier, and learned of the siege of Cuzco upon his return to Peru. Almagro's
army arrived at Cuzco in April 1537. His arrival atCwco brought the siege to an end'
Manco retreated into the highlands of the Vilcabamba valley. The siege at Lima ended a
few days later, and Spanish control was restored.Ta
After this revolt had been suppressed, there were other minor revolts throughout
the years, yet Spanish control was never again threatened in this manner. With the end
the siege of Cuzco, Pizarro had regained control of the empire - the Spaniards had won.
Now that the background of the conquest has been presented, I want to focus on





conquest of the Aztecs to his advantage. Pizarro had met Cortes while he was in Spain
and heard the details of his conquest.Ts Pizarro's experience in Peru had some interesting
parallels to that of Cort6s in Mexico. Within a few days of Cort6s' arrival, he learned of
Montezuma, who was a powerful ruler. Historian J.H. Elliot believes that this piece of
information suggested a natural stratery. "A ruler who himself had dominion over many
peoples must himself be brought, by force or trickery, to acknowledge a yet higher
lordship, that of the king of Spain."76 Cortes and his men were ultimately welcomed into
the capital, Tenochtitlan, and were given the opporfunity to follow through with Cortds
strategy. Montezuma was taken into their custody and made to accept the sovereignty of
the king of Spain. Cortes was able to exploit his authority, by keeping him as a puppet
ruler.1l However, the captivity of Montezuma upset the natives, and they revolted.
Montezuma was subsequently murdered; however there are differing accounts. The
Spanish account blames Montezuma's death on a fatal stone that was thrown by one of
his subjects. The Indians claim that the Spaniards strangled Montezuma. Pizano
recognized the parallels between Montezuma and Atahualpa when he was formulating his
plan.78
Historian J.H. Elliot believes that the capture of Montezuma allowed the Spanish
to use the existing administrative system to their advantage. They were able to transfer
Montezuma's authority into Spanish hands.Te Pizano hoped to do the same with
Atahualpa. A pre-existing factor that helped in the usurpation of power was that the







of a single ruler. This contributed greatly to Spanish succesr.*o By capturing the leader,
there was little hope that the rest of the population could organize a successful rebellion.
Historian William H. Prescott recognized that Pizarro planned on imitating the
events of Mexico, but he believed that Pizarro's methods fell short of what Cort6s had
accomplished. Prescott wrote:
When Pizarro landed in the country, he found it distracted by a contest for
the crown. It would seem to have been for his interest to play offone
party against the other, throwing his own weight into the scale that suited
him. Instead of this, he resorted to an act of audacious violence which
crushed them both at a blow. His subsequent career afforded no scope for
the profound policy displayed by Cortds, when he gathered conflicting
nations under his banner, and directed them against a common foe ...
Cort6s conducted his military operations on the scientific principles of a
great captain at the head of a powerful host. Pizarro appears only as an
adventurer, a fortunate knight-errant. By one bold stroke, he broke the
spell which had so long held the land under the dominion of the Incas ...
Thi, *ut good fortune]rather than the result of policy'8l
Prescott fails to give Pizarro any credit for his accomplishments. He believed that
it was the luck of finding the Incas involved in a civil war that aided Pizarro in his
conquest. He failed to recognize that Pizarro himself formed alliances and that the
capture of Atahualpa had required sffatery. Pizarro's success was not just the result of
good fortune, as Prescott has suggested.
Pizarro had greater opportunities for manipulating alliances than Cort6s. The civil
war offered him the chance to widen the rift that already existed. In the case of Cortds,
the native rivalry existed in peaceful groups. The civil war in Peru allowed the Spaniards
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to shift their allegiance a number oftimes.s2 In this manner, Pizarro was able to play one
faction against the other.
Pizarro was aided in this game by the alliances he made with native tribes. In this
respect, Pizarro also took his cue from Cortes. The conquest of Mexico demonstrated the
strategic advantages of creating alliances between native peoples, and keeping native
chiefs under Spanish authority. It was under this system that these chiefs also became
puppet rulers. This system was useful in maintaining native strife. Historian Charles
Gibson wrote, "The practice was, for Spain, transitional and strategic; it prmitted small
Spanish armies to subdue numerically superior native forces, pending the introduction of
permanent colonial government."s3 Cort6s was aided in his quest to recruit "allies,"
because the domination of the Aztecs over other peoples let to hatred and resentment.
Cort6s appeared as a liberator.8o Pirarro was able to channel the resentment of the
natives as well.
The character of the Aztec and Inca empires was that competing tribes had been
brought together under a central rule that was resented. Historian J.H. Elliot believes that
this allowed the Spanish to play one tribal grouping against another and tum subjugated
peoples against their masters. Once the central power had been overthrown, the Spanish
were in control of peoples accustomed to some level of subservience.8s Since the Incas
were more tightly organized than the Aztecs, it served to multiply internal strains. For






had appeared relatively recently. This left the empire vulnerable to the threat of civil
war, in which Atahualpa's main goal may have been to free Quito from Inca domination.
Author Michael A. Malpass attributes the willingness of the natives to help the
Spanish to the fact that they had been newly conquered themselves. Their lives had just
been changed, and they probably feared and hated the Incas.86 Certain groups saw their
chance to escape from Inca domination. In fact, the natives themselves provided Cort6s
and Pizarro with the bulk of their conquering armies, a point that has been pointed out by
historian Nathan Wachtel.sT The Spaniards were quick to exploit the civil war in Peru,
but they would have found native allies regardless, since most groups had been
conquered within the last three or four generations. The Spanish could rely on these
groups for logistical support, auxiliary troops, and local intelligence. They were,
however, unable to intercept communications between Atahualpa and his armies, as these
were sectye.88 Thus, the Spanish were unable to discover the plans Atahualpa may have
been making with his army. As a result, the Spanish could never rid themselves of the
fear that Atahualpa was planning a revolt.
Local Andean societies had good reason to ally themselves with the Spanish
conquest - they were impressed by their military prowess. Historian Steve J. Stern also
holds the view that peasant societies are sensitive to changes in power balance. They
were quick to recognize the Spanish as their new masters. These local societies saw that
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through the benefits of a Spanish alliance "they could break the yoke of Inca rule."8e
Pizarro was able to exploit the divisions caused by the civil war and create alliances to
create further tensions within the empire. The willingness of his native allies to turn on
their former rulers demonstrates the weaknesses that existed within the structure ofthe
Incan government. While the civil war and Pizarro's imitation of Cortds' methods can
explain Spanish success, there were other contributing factors.
The impact of disease certainly had its role as well. Historian J.H. Elliot writes,
The inhabitants of the New World would have to pay aheavy price for
their centuries of isolation. The conquest of America was a conquest by
microbes as well as men, sometime running ahead of the main Spanish
contingents, at others following in their wake.'o
Among the virgin soil epidemics that devastated the native population were
smallpox, measles, 'influenza', and 'plague'. Since they had been separated from the rest
of humanity for thousands of years, they had no defense.er In 1519, the Aztecs were
weakened by a smallpox epidemic. This must have spread throughout Central and South
America, because in1524 this disease afflicted the Inca Empire, causing the death of
thousands.e2 Historian Michael Malpass believes that "this dramatic loss by disease
probably did more than the Spanish horses and guns to contribute to the Incas'
conquest."93
Huayna Capac himself succumbed to the smallpox epidemic. His successor also
died, which opened the way for the dynastic struggles that facilitated Pizarro's
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conque$.e4 In this way, the Spanish unknowingly insured their defeat of the Incas long
before their arrival. Since Spanish diseases had reached the Incas, Huayna Capac's death
helped to assure their victory. As Pedro Pizarro stated, if Huayna Capac had been alive
when Pizano and his men arrived, they would not have been victorious.
Another aspect that worked in the Spaniards' favor was their possession of horses.
These horses shocked the native population. Cort6s, as well as Pizarro, used horses to
intimidate the native peoples. Whether this tactic was planned or not, it worked. The
horse gave the Spanish some advantages, such as striking power and speed, but the main
advantage they provided was that they were psychologically intimidating." When
confronted with the animals for the first time, the Incas simply did not know what to
make of them. This was further compounded by the rumor that horses lost all their
strength at night. This explains why Atahualpa did not arrive to meet Pizatro at
Cajamarca until nightfall. His strategy backfired.e6
When combined with the shock of first seeing men on horses, the arrival of the
Spanish themselves provided the natives with even more confusion. When confronted
with the site of men sitting atop horses, the Incas did not know what to make of these
beasts. At first, they mistakenly believed them to be gods. Juan de Betanzos writes,
"Since the Spaniards appeared as very strange beings ... every one ofthe Spaniards were
called'viracocha' (god)."" At the arrival of the Spaniards, Atahualpa's messengers,
when reporting on the white men's landing, referred to them as 'gods'. When he inquired
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o why they were calling them that, he received this answer: "In the olden times Contiti
Viracocha made the people. When he had finished, he entered that ocean ahead. He had
not returned."e8 Since the Spanish had arrived by sea, the Incas believed they were
Viracochas returning. However, historian Nathan Wachtel believes, these illusions were
soon shattered by greed and brutality of the Spaniards.ee There is little evidence,
however, that their initial belief contributed much to their defeat.
Another belief is that the Incas may have submitted to Inca rule due to the feeling
that defeat was their fate. According to Inoa legend, the Inca Viracocha was the first to
foresee the coming of the Spaniards. He had dreamt that "one day unknown bearded men
would land in Peru and overthrow both the religion and the Empire of the Incas."lffi
Author Sara Castro-Klar6n explains that the Incas interpreted the Spanish conquest as a
'?achacuti" - a cyclical destruction and restoration of the world.101 This appears to be
justification after the fact, and seems to have played little, or no, part in the conquest of
the Incas.
There is no question that the Spanish were militarily superior. The Incas had the
numerical advantage, but lacked sufficient weaponry to fight against the Spanish. There
was an estimated 100,000 armed lnca soldiers in the spring of 1532, yet they were
defeated. There were 5000 men in Atahualpa's bodyguard when he met Pizarro in
Cajamarca, and 168 men defeated them.lo2 The Inoas were exceptional soldiers
themselves, demonstrated by their conquest of neighboring peoples. But, those battles
e8 Betanzos, 235.
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were carried out on an even playing field.lo3 The Incas were relatively defenseless
against Spanish weaponry.
Moreover, Spanish methods of warfare underwent a transformation dwing the
first part of the sixteenth cenftrry. The Spanish had the advantage in weaponry.
Offensively, with their armor and steel helmets, they were virtually invulnerable against
Inca weaponry. They also had the advantage of the crossbow and gunpowder weapons,
although most soldiers preferred to use their swords, in which the slender blades of steel
were most effective on the Incas who lacked effective protection.loo These weapons
could slash right through their cotton armor. The Incas possessed no weapon that could
match them. They relied on weapons of stone and wood, as they themselves did not
posses the knowledge of steel. Their most effective weapons were their clubs, axes, and
slings, but they lacked slashing weapons. These were crushing weapons, which tended
only to wound their victims, rather than deliver a fatal blow. Even if they were to inflict
a blow, it would not usually prove to be fatal, as these weapons could not pierce the skin.
The Spanish had the advantage of lighter weapons. Swordplay was the most effective
mears of combat. Although Pizarro himself was a skilled horseman, he preferred to fight
on foot armed only with a sword.lo5
Historian J.H. Elliot recognizes that although the native societies were
accustomed to large-scale warfare, their style differed from the Spanish. He believes that
the Incas "in spite of their vast numerical superiority, had little hope of overwhelming a





o succeed in reducing them to exhaustion."l06 The Spanish used the element of surprise,
however, to their advantage. Upon their arrival atCalamarca, the Incas were not
expecting an ambush, and they were not prepared. The massacre that followed may not
be solely contributed to the superiority of Spanish weaponry or warfare.
gLlECIM0
Warfare in the Andes was fought with spears, clubs,
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Another element that conkibuted to Spanish success on the battlefield was their
cohesion. They worked together and acted as a group. This solidarity gave them more
strength as a unit. Pizarro displayed his skills in leadership by keeping his men together.
At Cajamarca, it was a highly organized group of vastly outnumbered soldiers who
defeated an army of 40,000 men, and captured their leader. This cohesion, however,




suppressed, a feud between Pizarro and Diego de Almagro caused the Spanish
themselves to break into rival factions and engage in their own civil war.
MH
Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Almagro Spanish Conquistador
(Both pictures courtesy of HuamimPuna, Letter to a King, (New Yor*: Dutlon, 1978), 106, 103.)
The Spanish were ruthless in their methods of conquest of the Incas. The death
count was staggering and their means of execution were savage. Historians have raised
many moral objections to their actions. It is unrealistic, however, to defend Pizarro or
pass judgments on him in terms of the standards of today. Pizano clearly reflects the
Spanish military mentality of the sixteenth century. Most of the men who took part in the
conquest had taken part in the reconquista. Pizano himself was a veteran of Granada.
Spain had just emerged from the reconquista, in which the Spanish successfully drove the
Moors out of Spain in 7492. This event has an interesting parallel with another event that
occurred that same year - the discovery of the New World. Historian Sabine
MacCormack sees how its participants can perceive the conquest as an extension of the
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reconquista.to7 Although the reconquista was a movement for the Spanish to reclaim
the lands of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors, it was also a war for territorial
expansion. The explorers carried that conquest mentality with them to the New World.
The Spanish arrival in the New World was a tragSc experience for the native
populations, but for them, conquest was not a foreign concept. The Incas had created
their empire by the domination of their neighbors. Author Robert Royal says that the
Spanish should not be chastised for looking to the New World for opportunities, because
the Indians themselves "were no strangers to need and conquest."1o8 It was a tragedy that
so many natives died, but the Spanish mentality was no diflerent from the Incas. This
paper has preferred to avoid passing judgment on the actions of Pizarro or his followers,
but to explain how this conquest occurred.
When Pizarro arrived in Peru, he was fortunate to learn that the Incas were
involved in a civil war. He realized the advantages he could gain by exploiting the rifts
that existed between the two factions. Furthermore, he succeeded in capturing the Inca
Atahualpa, which gave the Incas the experience of psychological defeat. The supporting
role of other factors cannot be overlooked. Superior Spanish weaponry did provide the
Spanish with an advantage on the battlefield. The formation of alliances with the native
population provided the Spanish with inside information, and extra help in times of
combat. Spanish possession of horses first provided an element of fear within the native
population, but once the natives became accustomed to these beasts, they provided a
military advantage to the Spanish, especially during the siege of Cuzco. These factors,
and the impact of diseases that weakened the indigenous population prior to their arrival,
107 Maccormack,423.
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definitely contributed to Spanish success, yet it was the civil war and the employment of
Cortds' political methods that contributed most to the Spanish cause. Pizarro dealt with
Inca succession, rival factions, and Inca rebellion with a mentality that compensated for
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